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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
of the court agreed. The majority, however, refused to entertain such a strict
interpretation of the section and held that it was satisfied by any method whereby
there was a clear designation of the sex of the candidates. Furthermore, such an
interpretation, they felt, is fortified by the provision in the Election Law stating
that the order in which the names appear on the ballot is determined by lot.'5
The majority's view is the more realistic approach. The provisions of the
Election Law should be liberally construed to allow ballots in a form which could
cause no possible confusion or difficulty. 16 But in the present case it does not
appear how clear the ballot was in fact. If there was no indication that the voter
should vote for one male and one female, there could reasonably be votes cast for
two males, for instance, and the ballot should have been made clearer. The Court,
however, apparently found otherwise.
INSURANCE LAW
Presumption Against Suicide
A very popular protective feature which is included in many life insurance
contracts is the so-called double indemnity clause.' In most instances, this provides
for payment of an additional sum equal to the face value of the policy upon
receipt by the insurer of due proof that the sole cause of the insured's death was
bodily injury and that bodily injury was produced solely by external, violent and
accidental means. 2 The insured's self-destruction, of course, is not death by acci3
dental means, and double indemnity clauses expressly exclude this risk.
In Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,4 the insured's body was found
beneath the window of his second-story hospital room; no one had witnessed the
events leading to his fatal injury; and investigation disclosed that the window was
up and the screen broken. There was some evidence that the insured who had
been suffering from various diseases was mentally depressed during the weeks
immediately preceding his death. In the death proofs submitted by the beneficiary
death was attributed to certain head injuries, but copies of the death certificate
and the medical examiner's report contained the added comment "Jumped or fell
from window of Veterans Hospital 7/4/52."
15. N. Y. ELECTION LAW §104. Order of names upon ballot... 2. The officer
or board with whom or which is filed the designations for a public office or party
position shall determine by. lot, . . . the order in which shall be printed on the
official primary ballott, . . . the names of candidates for a party position ....
16. Bellord v. Board of Elections, 306 N. Y. 70, 115 N. E. 2d 658 (1953).
1. This protection is offered by most major life insurance companies. See
THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER CO., WHO WRITES WHAT (1955) p. 82.
2. See samples of company contracts set forth in CHILTON Co., THE SPECTATOR
HANDY GUIDE (1956).

3. -Id.
4. 1 N. Y. 2d 530, 136 N. E. 2d 839 (1956).
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The beneficiary brought 'suit against the Insurance Company when it refused
to pay the double indemnity proceeds. The plaintiff's case consisted of the death
proofs which had been submitted to the defendant. The Company defended on the
grounds that (1) plaintiff's proofs of death failed to show that death resulted
from accidental means and (2) the insured in fact committed suicide. The
Appellate Division 5 reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the
complaint-reasoning: a showing of accidental death is a condition precedent to
recovery; proof containing the statements "jumped or fell" is not due proof of
accidental death; any prima facie case which the plaintiff may have had by virtue
of the presumption against suicide0 is overcome by defendant's evidence 7 showing
circumstances wholly inconsistent with accidental death. In reversing the Appellate
Division and ordering a new trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was
error for the Appellate Division to hold, as a matter of law, that the proof
submitted was insufficient. To paraphrase the Court's holding on this defense:
where the contract fails to spell out the elements, due proof is that from which
a reasonable person might infer accidental death, and since no one witnessed the
event the words "jumped or fell" do not conclusively show suicide.
'As regards the defendant's affirmative defense of self-destruction the Court,
in effect, decided that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the presumption
against suicide: "When death has resulted from violence, the presumption . . .
does more than shift the burden of proof and upon having done so disappears
from the case; it continues to the end of the case and if a fair question of fact is
presented as to whether death was due to suicide or accident, then the jury should
answer accident. Wellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co."8 The Wellisch case
did not involve a suit on the double indemnity clause, but a defense of suicide to
avoid paying the sum insured when death occurred during the first two policy
years.9 The decision in the instant case seemingly applies the dicta in Wlellisch to
an action for double indemnity where the plaintiff not only must show the insured's
death but also has the burden of proving that his decease came about in the
particular manner described in the double indemnity clause. But for the fact that
5. Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 285 App. Div. 961, 138 N. Y. S.
2d 851 (2d Dep't 1955).
6. Man is presumed not to take his own life. Mallory v. The Travelers"Ins.
Co., 47 N. Y. 52, 7 Am. Rep. 410 (1871); Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 293 N. Y. 178 56 N. E. 2d 540 (1944).
7. I.e., Insured's mental condition, the raised window and broken screen, and
the distance between the body when found and the base of the hospital building.
8. 293 N. Y. 178, 56 N. E. 2d 540 (1944). The court there held that It was
error for the trial court to direct a verdict of suicide when the insurer's evidence

was not conclusive. In dicta the Court expounded upon the nature of the pre-

sumption against suicide: it does not only shift the burden of proof, nor does it
take the place-of evidence so as to create a question of fact when all the evidence
is the other way--"it is really a rule or guide for the jury in coming to a con-

clusion on the evidence."

9. See N. Y. INSURANcE LAW §155(2).
10. See Whitlatch v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 149 N. Y. 45, 43 N. E.
405 (1896); Ostrander v. Travelers' rus. Co.; 265 N. Y. 467, 193 N. E. 274 (1934).
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the Court ordered a new trial, this case would conclusively answer those who ask
whether the presumption has the same force in a suit for double indemnity" and
only
have the effect of overruling cases which indicate that the presumption's
2
purpose is to assist the plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case.1
In this writer's opinion, the Court has gone too far in applying the presumption as outlined -in the Wellisch case to this kind of an action. Doubtless the
Court was influenced by the social opprobrium resulting from a decision implying
suicide, but when the Court indicates that the jury should always find death was
accidental where there is a question of fact it imposes an undue burden upon the
insurer when, as is 'the normal case, the only evidence of the cause of death is
circumstantial. Nor is the social policy favoring the payment of life insurance
very persuasive in this instance for life insurance needs are not dependent upon
the manner of death.
Stafemenfs of Good Healfth
In Bronx Savings Bank v. Weigandt,l3 the plaintiff brought an action to
rescind a policy- of savings bank life insurance which it had issued to the deceased
approximately three months before his death. The insurer contended that the
insured had falsely represented that he was in good health; 14 and that the
policy never took effect because the insured was not in good health when the
policy -was delivered and the first premium paid. The defendant-beneficiary counterclaimed for the face value of the policy.
The insured, who died as the result of injuries, had stated in the application
that he never had or been told that he had tuberculosis, and none was found by
the Bank's medical examiner. At the trial it was established that the deceased was
suffering from active tuberculosis of the spine at the time he applied for the
insurance, but it was not shown that he knew or had reason to know of his
condition. Faced with the rule that a life insurance applicant's statements are
representations and not warranties' 5-hence rescission will not be granted unless
there is a fraudulent misrepresentation' 6-the plaintiff argued that the Court will
11. See a.g., MATHESON AND PRINCE, EVIDENCE, Foundation Press (1949) p. 35.
12. Jahn v. The Commercial Travelers Mut. Assoc., of Am., 256 App. Div.
835, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 257 (2d Dep't 1939); Steinmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
257 App. Div. 656, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (1st Dep't 1939).
13. 1 N. Y. 2d 545, 136 X. E. 2d 848 (1956).
14. These words appeared at the bottom of a page of the application:
"Except as stated' above I am now in good health. The statements herein are

true . . . and made for the purpose of inducing the Bank to issue insurance

on my life."
15. N. Y. INSURANCE LAW §142(3). For definitions and explanations of the
words representations and warranties as regards life insurance contracts see
37 WORDS AND PHRASES 40; BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) 1465, 1758.
16. Sommer v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 281. N, Y, 508, 4 N, E. 2d 308 (1939).

